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Abstract
This paper explores the scientific viability of the concept of causality—by 
questioning a central element of the distinction between “fundamental” and 
non-fundamental physics. It will be argued that the prevalent emphasis on 
fundamental physics involves formalistic and idealized partial models of physi-
cal regularities abstracting from and idealizing the causal evolution of physical 
systems. The accepted roles of partial models and of the special sciences in the 
growth of knowledge help demonstrate proper limitations of the concept of 
fundamental physics. We expect that a cause precedes its effect. But in some 
tension with this point, fundamental physical law is often held to be symmetri-
cal and all-encompassing. Physical time, however, has not only measurable 
extension, as with spatial dimensions, it also has a direction—from the past 
through the present into the future. This preferred direction is time’s arrow. In 
spite of this standard contrast of time with space, if all the fundamental laws of 
physics are symmetrical, they are indifferent to time’s arrow. In consequence, 
excessive emphasis on the ideal of symmetrical, fundamental laws of physics 
generates skepticism regarding the common-sense and scientific uses of the 
concept of causality. The expectation has been that all physical phenomena are 
capable of explanation and prediction by reference to fundamental physicals 
laws—so that the laws and phenomena of statistical thermodynamics—and of 
the special sciences—must be derivative and/or secondary. The most important 
and oft repeated explanation of time’s arrow, however, is provided by the 
second law of thermodynamics. This paper explores the prospects for time’s 
arrow based on the second law. The concept of causality employed here is 
empirically based, though acknowledging practical scientific interests, and is 
linked to time’s arrow and to the thesis that there can be no causal change, in 
any domain of inquiry, without physical interaction. 
I. Temporal symmetry and fundamental physics
It is prevalently held that the fundamental or primary laws of physics are 
symmetric in time and all-encompassing.1 Part of the plausibility of this under-
 This paper was first presented at the 2015 Conference on Model-based Reasoning held in 
Sestri Levante, Italy; and it will be published by Springer, 2016 in the Proceedings of the 
Conference edited by Lorenzo Magnani. I would like to thank Professor Magnani and the 
anonymous referees for helpful comments.  
1. See, e.g., Davies, Paul 1977, The Physics of Time Asymmetry, p. 26, who puts it this way: 
“All known laws of physics are invariant under time reversal,”—though noting the singular 
exception of processes involving K-mesons and the weak force. Cf. Greene, Brian 2004, 
The Fabric of the Cosmos, p. 145: “…not only do known laws fail to tells us why we see 
2standing of physical law depends on the relationship of physics to the special 
sciences. There is a plausible sense in which physics is fundamental in relation 
to the special sciences. If exceptions are found to laws or generalizations of the 
special sciences such as psychology, biology or chemistry, then one reasonably 
seeks explanation in more basic or underlying scientific laws or generalizations. 
Psychology may reasonably seek answers to some of its problems in physiology 
or neurology, biology may look to biochemistry, and chemistry may look to 
physics, etc. 
But in physics the pursuit of underlying explanatory factors or mechanism 
comes to an end, in the sense that there is no more basic natural science which 
provides needed explanations or understanding of anomalies or exceptions in 
physics.2 I see little ground to question the thesis. This is quite different, 
however, from the claim that the special sciences are somehow incomplete or 
defective until and unless they are fully explained by or reduced to details of 
physics.
Nobel Prize winning physicist, Steven Weinberg, emphasized a related point 
in his 1992 book, Dreams of a Final Theory: 
When we say that one truth explains another, as for instance that the physical 
principles (the rules of quantum mechanics) governing electrons in electric fields 
explain the laws of chemistry, we do not necessarily mean that we can actually 
deduce the truths we claim have been explained. Sometimes we can complete the 
deduction, as for the chemistry of the very simple hydrogen molecule. But 
sometimes the problem is just too complicated for us. In speaking in this way of 
scientific explanations, we have in mind not what scientists actually deduce but 
instead a necessity built into nature itself.3
The sense in which quantum mechanics explains laws of chemistry involves a 
kind of projection from simple cases, where the relationship is clear, to more 
complex cases, where the actual deduction of chemical laws or properties of 
complex atoms and molecules is impractical. One reason that chemistry persists 
in its special modes of understanding and explanation, instead of simply substi-
tuting physics, is that the required physics is not fully suited to the complexi-
ties; and, in effect, as Weinberg has it, “sometimes the problem is just too 
complicated for us.” Still, where anomalies or exceptions to chemical laws 
appear, one expects that study of the relevant physics might be very helpful. 
While generally sympathetic to what Weinberg says in this passage, I would 
emphasize, too, the small contrast I introduced between thinking of this as a 
matter of reasonable scientific projection and Weinberg’s talk of a “necessity 
built into nature itself.” Projections from a well understood model can be more 
or less reasonable, given the state of scientific knowledge, but talk of necessi-
ties of nature resists the gradation. 
Within physics, there is a prevalent view that various laws, particles or 
physical constants are more basic, fundamental, primary or foundational, 
events unfold in only one order, they also tell us that, in theory, events can unfold in reverse 
order.”
2. Cf. e.g., Fodor, J.A. 1974, “Special Sciences,” Synthse, Vol. 28, pp. 77-115. Reprinted in 
Fodor 1981, RePresentations, pp. 127-45, “all events that fall under the laws of any science 
are physical events and hence fall under the laws of physics.” 
3. Weinberg, Steven 1992, Dreams of a Final Theory, p. 9. 
3usually in the sense that they play a central role in explaining and ordering a 
wide range of physical or scientific generalizations. This idea is reflected, for 
example, in detailed accounts of the fundamental particles of the Standard 
Model of particle physics.4 But it is sometimes explicitly held that the funda-
mental particles of the Standard Model are simply those which are, as yet, not 
subject to further analysis or explanation. A powerful particle collider, such as 
the LHC at Geneva, provides energy sufficient to detect quarks within the 
proton and neutron, but no one has yet detected anything smaller within quarks 
or electrons. It is important to distinguish, then, between holding that some 
presently accepted generalizations are “fundamental” in relation to what is 
presently known, and saying, on the other hand, that there must be some system 
of fundamental physics governing all that will ever come to be known. 
Temporal symmetry is a matter of the reversibility of physical events and 
processes in accordance with physical law. The existence of an arrow of time, it 
has been argued, “is puzzling,” because “all basic theories in physics seem to be 
time symmetric or time reversal invariant.”5 Or, what is sometimes claimed to 
be equivalent, is that the fundamental physical laws conserve information.6
Sean Carroll argues, along related lines, that what is crucial is “our ability to 
reconstruct the past from the present,” and “the key concept that ensures 
reversibility is conservation of information;” if the information needed to 
specify any state of the world is always preserved, then “we will always be able 
to run the clock backward and recover any previous state.”7
Applying fundamental physical laws, e.g., to atoms, molecules, or other 
bodies, given their present positions and momentum, one could, in principle, 
equally calculate their future or past positions and momentum. Given the 
fundamental laws, information concerning physical units of a system at any 
given time, carries with it implications regarding the system at any other time. 
As the British astrophysicist, A.S. Eddington concisely put it, speaking to the 
issue of reversibility, “when the [primary] laws are formulated mathemati-
cally,” then “there is no more distinction between past and future than between 
right and left.”8 Though similar views are widely held, I want to suggest that 
this idea has the ring of excessive idealization. 
4. See, e.g., the brief account in Penrose, Roger 2004, The Road to Reality, pp. 627-654; and 
Carroll, Sean 2012, The Particle at the End of the Universe, “Appendix Two, Standard 
Model Particles,” pp. 293-298. 
5. Savitt, Steven F. 1995, “Introduction” in Savitt, Steven F. (ed.) Time’s Arrow Today, Recent 
Physical and Philosophical Work on the Direction of Time, p. 6. 
6. See e.g., Susskind, Leonard 2008, The Black Hole War, p. 87: “There is another very subtle 
law of physics that may be even more fundamental than energy conservation. Its sometimes 
called reversibility, but let’s just call it information conservation.” 
7. Carroll, Sean 2010, From Eternity to Here, The Quest for the Ultimate Theory of Time, p. 
121. 
8. Callaway, H.G. ed. 2014, A.S. Eddington, The Nature of the Physical World, An Annotated 
Edition, p. 76. 
4II. Background for Fundamental Physics 
In spite of Eddington’s appeal to precise mathematical formulation, it seems 
best for philosophical purposes to follow Einstein and Infield on “fundamental 
ideas”:
Fundamental ideas play the most essential role in forming a physical theory. 
Books on physics are full of complicated mathematical formulae. But thought 
and ideas, not formulae, are the beginning of every physical theory. The ideas 
must later take the mathematical form of quantitative theory, to make possible 
the comparison with experiment.9
The symmetric, time invariant concept of fundamental physics is rooted, 
historically, in the interpretation of Newton’s laws of motion and his theory of 
universal gravity. As Einstein put it, writing in 1940, “The first attempt to lay a 
uniform theoretical foundation was the work of Newton”10
This Newtonian basis proved eminently fruitful and was regarded as final up to 
the end of the nineteenth century. It not only gave results for the movements of 
the heavenly bodies, down to the most minute details, but also furnished a theory 
of the mechanics of discrete and continuous masses, a simple explanation of the 
principle of the conservation of energy and a complete and brilliant theory of 
heat. The explanation of the facts of electrodynamics within the Newtonian 
system was more forced; least convincing of all, from the very beginning, was 
the theory of light.11
Newton’s physics eventually gave rise to the “iron determinism” of Laplace’s 
Philosophical Essay on Probabilities.12 According to Laplace, the future is 
completely determined by the past; and equally, a complete knowledge of the 
present state of every particle or body completely determines every past 
configuration. The world is thus a causal “block universe,” to use the familiar 
philosophical term from William James.13
Laplace, in an oft quoted passage from his “Essay on Probabilities,” provides 
the following image of the Newtonian world, as viewed by some “immense 
intelligence”:
We ought to regard the present state of the universe as the effect of its antecedent 
state and as the cause of the state that is to follow. An intelligence knowing all 
the forces acting in nature at a given instant, as well as the monetary positions of 
all things in the universe, would be able to comprehend in one single formula the 
motions of the largest bodies as well as the lightest atoms in the world, provided 
that its intellect were sufficiently powerful to subject all data to analysis; to it 
nothing would be uncertain, the future as the past would be present to its eyes. 
9. Einstein, Albert and Leopold Infield 1938, The Evolution of Physics, p. 277. 
10.Cf. Einstein, Albert 1940, “Considerations Concerning the Fundamentals of Theoretical 
Physics,” Science, vol. 91, No. 2369, p. 488. 
11.Einstein 1940, “Considerations,” p. 488. 
12.Laplace, Pierre-Simon 1820/1902, A Philosophical Essay on Probabilities, the Introduction 
to his Thorie Analytique des Probabilits. 
13.See James, William 1909/2008, A Pluralistic Universe, p. 47, in the 2008 edition: “Every 
single event is ultimately related to every other, and determined by the whole to which it 
belongs.” In James’ general conception of the block universe, the determination need not be 
causal. 
5The perfection that the human mind has been able to give to astronomy affords 
but a feeble outline of such an intelligence.14
For this imagined and vastly powerful intelligence, which came to be called 
“Laplace’s demon,” nothing would be uncertain, “the future as the past would 
be present to its eyes.” This is a powerful philosophical image of a world of 
mechanical, deterministic causation, as nearly comprehensive as the medieval 
philosophical image of atemporal Divine omniscience.15
Writing in the late 1920’s near the end of the period which saw the intensive 
development of the twentieth century’s two great revolutions in physics, 
relativity and quantum mechanics, Eddington posed the question and expressed 
some doubts regarding the comprehensive character of “primary law.”
I have called the laws controlling the behavior of single individuals “primary 
laws,” implying that the second law of thermodynamics, although a recognized 
law of Nature, is in some sense a secondary law. This distinction can now be 
placed on a regular footing. Some things never happen in the physical world
because they are impossible; others because they are too improbable. The laws 
which forbid the first are the primary laws; the laws which forbid the second are 
the secondary laws. It has been the conviction of nearly all physicists16 that at the 
root of everything there is a complete scheme of primary law governing the 
career of every particle or constituent of the world with an iron determinism. 
This primary scheme is all-sufficing, for, since it fixes the history of every 
constituent of the world, it fixes the whole world-history.17
Eddington’s doubts concerning “iron determinism” and the “conviction of 
nearly all physicists,” are directly connected with the status of the second law of 
thermodynamics. In any closed system, entropy, understood as a measure of the 
disorder of physical systems, tends to increase. That is to say that the usable 
energy, suited or configured to perform work decreases. Time’s arrow follows 
a statistical order of development—from less probable, but more orderly 
configurations toward more probable and less orderly configurations. If the 
second law, telling us that entropy in a closed system always increases (or at 
best remains constant) is demoted to “secondary” status, and thought of, say, as 
a practical means of keeping track of developments on larger scales, when the 
micro-scale details of particles and motions are too complex, then time’s arrow, 
as tracked by the second law, suffers a similar demotion. 
On a deeper level, though, the question may be posed of the relationship 
between the statistical character of the second law and the probabilistic charac-
ter of quantum mechanics—according to which physical chance is basic. In 
spite of this possible basis, the idea of a system of “fundamental” or primary 
14.Laplace 1820/1902, p. 4. 
15.Contrast Lloyd, Seth 2006, Programming the Universe, p. 98: “Even if the underlying laws 
of physics were fully deterministic, however, … to perform the type of simulation Laplace 
envisaged, the calculating demon would have to have at least as much computational power 
as the universe as a whole.” This is to suggest that the required computation is physically 
impossible. 
16.Eddington’s note: “There are, however, others beside myself who have recently begun to 
question it.” See Eddington 2014, p. 85, fn 1. 
17.Eddington 2014, p. 85. 
6and time symmetric physical law has often, even chiefly, survived the challenge 
posed to it by quantum mechanics and by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. 
To see why this is, we may return to Einstein’s related views. Taking into 
account the varieties of science, focused on more limited domains and closer to 
human experience, Einstein has it that “from the very beginning there has 
always been present the attempt to find a unifying theoretical basis for all the 
single sciences…”18 Such a “unifying theoretical basis,” as he sees it, consists
…of a minimum of concepts and fundamental relationships, from which all the 
concepts and relationships of the single disciplines might be derived by logical 
process. This is what we mean by a search for a foundation of the whole of 
physics. The confident belief that this ultimate goal may be reached is the chief 
source of the passionate devotion which has always animated the researcher.19
On this approach, fundamental physics aims to encompass all the concepts and 
laws required for ideal comprehension and unification of scientific results, 
including all more specialize and practical sub-disciplines; and there is clearly a 
strong suggestion here of logical reduction of the “whole of physics” to the 
“fundamental concepts and relationships.” To use the literary term, it is very 
much a matter of searching for thematic unity—of a strictly logical and 
explanatory sort. 
To the end of his life, Einstein worked at a “unified field theory,” which 
would be a comprehensive fundamental theory, unifying the gravitational field 
of his theory of general relativity, with the theory of the electromagnetic field, 
starting from Maxwell’s equations. It was a desideratum of this program that it 
would ultimately account for quantum mechanics as correct so far as it went, 
but non-fundamental.20 He remained convinced of the “incompleteness” of 
quantum mechanics, with its intrinsic chance, “quantum jumps,” super-posi-
tions and non-local quantum entanglements.21 Einstein’s projection of a 
preferred direction of the development of fundamental physics, however, came 
into conflict with the actual, historical  course of its development. Taking that 
lesson seriously, one will also understand the tendency to identify “fundamental 
Physics” with investigation of the open problems arising from its best estab-
lished theories.22 The best laid plans of mice and men often go astray, and so it 
is with the best laid scientific projections of fundamental physics.
18.Einstein 1940, “Considerations,” p. 488. 
19.Einstein 1940, “Considerations,” p. 488. 
20.Cf. Sauer, T. 2014, “Einstein’s Unified Field Theory Program,” in Jannsen, Michel and 
Christoph Lehner eds, 2014, The Cambridge Companion to Einstein, p. 287. 
21.See, e.g., the very influential “EPR paper:” Einstein, Albert, P. Podolsky, and N. Rosen 
1935, “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality be Considered 
Complete?” Physical Review 47, pp. 777-780.  
22.See, for instance, Hewett, J.L., H. Weets et al. 2012, Fundamental Physics at the Intensity 
Frontier, Report of the Workshop held December 2011 in Rockville, MD. SLAC National 
Accelerator Laboratory, Stanford University. The editors of the volume comment that the 
Standard Model of particles physics “leaves some big questions unanswered;” Some of 
these questions “are within the Standard Model itself,” such as “why there are so many 
fundamental particles and why they have different masses;” and “In other cases, the 
Standard Model simply fails to explain some phenomena, such as the observed matter-
antimatter asymmetry in the universe, the existence of dark matter and dark energy, and the 
mechanism that reconciles gravity with quantum mechanics.” If what is regarded as 
7Einstein’s doubts concerning quantum theory are usually viewed as obsolete. 
Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is taken to supersede Newtonian, Laplacean 
or Einsteinian determinism, since there is a fundamental uncertainty in the 
positions and velocities of the basic constituents of the universe. Few are the 
contemporary physicists who would try to remove the uncertainty relation from 
physics. Yet, this is not the end of the story, since there is also a quantum 
conception of determinism, arising from the uniform evolution of the 
Schrdinger equation and its derivatives. As Brian Greene has put the point, 
“Knowledge of the wave functions of all of the fundamental ingredients of the 
universe at some moment in time allows a “vast enough” intelligence to deter-
mine the wave functions at any prior or future time.”23 The point shifts 
determinism from the calculation of outcomes of physical interactions to the 
calculation of the probabilities for groups of outcomes, while the quantum 
uncertainty of prediction and measurement of individual results is retained.  
Whether determinism belongs to fundamental physics comes, in this way, to 
depend on the emphasis placed on calculation of probabilities vs. the uncer-
tainty of particular measurements. 
III. Models in physics and the concept of the graviton
The general wave-particle duality of quantum mechanics and quantum field 
theory encourages postulation of the graviton, conceived in analogy to the 
photon as the carrier of the gravitational force. In accordance with hypotheses 
directly quantizing the gravitational field, the graviton would be a spin2 particle 
of zero mass and zero electrical charge, traveling at the speed of light. Wave-
particle duality is formalized in contemporary physics, telling us that particle 
momentum p is equal to the Planck constant h divided by wavelength λ. 
p = h/λ 
This formula draws on Einstein’s work on the photoelectric effect, the equiva-
lence of mass and energy, and de Broglie’s hypothesis of matter waves. Thus, 
to extend the argument, if there are gravitational waves, of a given wavelength, 
then there will be corresponding particles, analogous to photons—of zero mass 
and very small momentum. In Einstein’s general theory of relativity, informa-
tion is never transmitted faster than the speed of light, and on some models of 
quantum gravity, the graviton is wanted to carry information concerning 
changing positions of masses and the associated gravitational fields at finite 
speed and over unlimited range. In effect, the hypothesis formulated in quantum 
field theory is that masses interact gravitationally by exchange of gravitons.
However, the hypothesis of gravitational waves enjoys much firmer support. 
Gravitational waves are a prediction of general relativity on most prominent 
accounts.24 General relativity has been confirmed in repeated and varied empiri-
“fundamental” is viewed as open to question and inquiry, then the concept is much less 
problematic.  
23.Greene, Brian 2000, The Elegant Universe, p. 341. 
24.See, for instance Weinberg, Steven 1977/1988, The First Three Minuets, p. 147-148: 
“Gravitational radiation interacts far more weakly with matter than electromagnetic radia-
tion, or even neutrinos” and he continues, “For this reason, although we are reasonably 
confident on theoretical grounds of the existence of gravitational radiation, the most strenu-
8cal tests for nearly a century. Though gravitational waves have not been 
detected, as of yet (early 2015), they are firmly expected as a further confirma-
tion of general relativity. Much time, money and effort has been expended on 
the construction and calibration of sensitive detection devices, such as LIGO 
(the Laser Interferometer Gravitational Wave Observatory).25 Following 
Einstein, gravitational waves are an expected effect of accelerating masses, in 
analogy with how electromagnetic waves are created by moving charges. Yet 
gravity is the weakest of the four fundamental forces of nature by many orders 
of magnitude, and in consequence, the displacements that physicists can expect 
to measure with instruments such as LIGO, as the signals of passing gravita-
tional waves, are extremely small—on the order of 10-18 meters, which is 1000 
times smaller than the diameter of a single proton.26 The experimental design 
depends on reflecting light along two long tracks, set at right angles to each 
other, and bringing the beams of light back, via mirrors, to a central point where 
interference can be detected, indicating a slight change in length of one of the 
two paths. 
One expected source of gravitational waves are pairs of small and extremely 
dense neutron stars in mutual orbit, or again, pairs of black holes spiraling in 
toward each other and their eventual fusion. Important observational results 
have shown that identified binary pulsars do in fact lose energy, as they spiral 
inward, consistent with the prediction from general relativity of their loss of 
energy by emission of gravitational waves. Astrophysicists Joseph Taylor and 
Russell Hulse were awarded the Nobel prize for their related work, using the 
timing of a pulsar as a precise clock, allowing a measurements, over decades, of 
the predicted energy loss.27
The prospect of detecting gravitons, in contrast, is extremely dim.28 The 
point has been emphasized in writings of Freeman Dyson, and I quote from the 
defenders of the detection of gravitons. In comparison with the prospects of 
detecting gravitational waves, 
ous efforts have so far apparently failed to detect gravitational waves from any source.” On 
the history of the decades long theoretical debate, including Einstein’s own occasional 
doubts, see Kennefick, Daniel 2007, Traveling at the Speed of Thought. Approximate solu-
tions of the Einstein equations predicting gravitational waves date to Einstein 1916, 
“Nhrungsweise Integration der Feldgleichungen der Gravitation.” See Einstein 1916, 
“Approximative Integration of the Field Equations of Gravitation,” in Einstein 1997, The 
Collected Papers of Albert Einstein, Vol. 6, The Berlin Years, pp. 201-210.  
25.The LIGO project, with major facilities in Louisiana and Washington State, is the largest 
scientific project ever funded by the U.S. National Science Foundation, to the tune of over 
$300 million in capital investment and $30 million per year, since the early 1990s. 
26.See “Introduction to LIGO and Gravitational Waves,” at the LIGO web pages.  
27.See e.g., Taylor’s Nobel Lecture, describing his work, 1997, “Binary Pulsars and Relativis-
tic Gravity.” The observed loss of energy is consistent with the generation of gravitational 
waves, in accordance with solutions of the Einstein field equations. 
28.See Dyson, Freeman 2012, “Is a Graviton Detectable?” (his Poincar Prize Lecture). See 
also Dyson’s review of Brian Greene’s The Fabric of the Cosmos, in The New York Review 
of Books, May 13, 2004. On the prospect of detection of gravitons in a particle collider, 
Sean Carroll writes, “Gravitons are only produced by gravitational interaction, which is so 
weak that essentially no gravitons are made in a collider and we don’t have to worry about 
them.” See Carroll 2012, The Particle at the End of the Universe, p. 104-105. 
9The possibility of detecting individual gravitons is far more daunting. Indeed 
Freeman Dyson and colleagues have cogently estimated that it may in fact be 
infinitely more daunting, namely that it is likely to be impossible to physically 
realize a detector sensitive to individual gravitons without having the detector 
collapse into a black hole in the process.29
Though both general relativity and quantum field theory are regularly counted 
to fundamental physics, the graviton does not appear in general relativity or in 
the Standard Model of particle physics—which does not encompass gravitation. 
The graviton is instead a postulate which appears in projecting the quantum 
field theory used in the Standard Model in the hope of unifying its three 
forces—the electromagnetic force, the strong nuclear force and the weak 
force—with gravity. A chief point of interest in this, for present purposes, is to 
understand the contrast of theoretical standing between the use of the word 
“model” in the description of the Standard Model of particle physics, and the 
idea of including the graviton in a more comprehensive model. 
The standard model of particle physics is admittedly incomplete, since it 
does not encompass gravity. Beyond that, it is generally recognized that most of 
the matter in the universe (so-called “dark matter”) takes forms outside the 
standard model.30 Yet the standard model is also extremely well supported by 
experimental evidence, and the recent detection of the Higgs boson at CERN 
counts as further confirmation. To speak of “the Standard Model,” as a model, 
is somewhat concessionary, in light of its strong empirical support—with an 
eye to its incompleteness. In a similar way, general relativity has met every test 
to which it has been subjected, though the lack of integration of GR with 
quantum mechanics leaves room for new physics. However, the models of new 
physics which include the graviton, are more theoretical and even speculative; 
and very little supporting evidence is available. Weinberg writes:
Because string theories incorporate gravitons and a host of other particles, they 
provide for the first time the basis for a possible final theory. Indeed, because a 
graviton seems to be an unavoidable feature of any string theory, one can say 
that string theory explains why gravitons exist.31
But this is a very weak sense of explanation and more a matter of a theoretical, 
explanatory proposal. String theory predicts the existence of the graviton, as we 
may understand Weinberg to claim, and would explain the graviton, if string 
theory were sufficiently supported as a “final theory.” 
While the Standard Model of particle physics and general relativity each 
belong to more settled “fundamental physics,” models including the graviton 
are more speculative theoretical projections or possible additions to fundamen-
tal physics. They are invoked in particular proposals concerning quantum 
gravity, or the problem of how to integrate general relativity with quantum 
mechanics; and they treat of quantum field theory as something to be preserved 
29.Krausss, L.M. and F. Wilczek 2014, “Using Cosmology to Establish the Quantization of 
Gravity,” Physical Review D, 89, No. 4. See also Rothman, T. and S. Boughn 2006, “Can 
Gravitons be Detected?” Foundations of Physics 36, pp. 1801-1825 
30.See e.g., Carroll, Sean 2010, From Eternity to Here, p. 389: “…there must be dark matter, 
and we have ruled out all known particles as candidates… .”  
31.Weinberg 1992, Dreams, p. 216. 
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at certain limits, as “effective quantum field theory” and extended to gravita-
tion. Yet models strongly committed to postulating the graviton are only some 
among a variety of theoretical approaches to the tensions between general rela-
tivity and quantum mechanics.32 As a general matter, Dyson’s problem of 
detecting the graviton reflects the incompatibilities between GR and QFT, 
centered on the background metric assumed in QFT vs. the background inde-
pendence of GR and the dim prospect of any physical probing of the Planck 
length. The physical energies required to probe structures at the scale of the 
Planck length of 10-33 cm are so great that they would disrupt the physical
geometry of the structures under study.33 The point casts some doubt on the 
approach to quantum gravity based on string theory and QFT and opens the 
door to approaches to quantum gravity based in background independent, non-
commutative geometry. From this perspective, even the well-confirmed 
Standard Model of particle physics, in spite of its considerable strides and 
impressive empirical support, is one among possible alternative models for new 
physics beyond.     
IV. Quantum indeterminacy and temporal symmetry
Newtonian mechanics, Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism, and Einstein’s 
revisions of Newtonian theory in special and general relativity count as fully 
deterministic, in accordance with the claimed temporal symmetry of funda-
mental physics; but there is also historical and contemporary interest in the 
challenge represented by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the chance or 
probabilistic element in quantum mechanics. This stands in tension with the 
strong contrary tendency to think of quantum theory in terms of the uniform 
evolution of the wave function of the Schrdinger equation and to discount the 
cogency of indeterministic “quantum state reduction” or the “collapse of the 
wave function.” This is one way in which the thesis of temporal symmetry 
enters into the complex of issues connected with the interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.
Regarding the chance element in contemporary physics, we need to ask 
whether chance will be fully subdued by and assimilated to the uniform evolu-
tion of the wave function, or on the contrary, if it might better be regarded as 
something ramifying through the complexities of the physical world and the 
wider domains of scientific phenomena. Where isolated, a quantum system 
evolves in accordance with the Schrdinger equation, which allows for the 
calculation of probabilities of outcomes of measurements. The other element, 
however, shows how the state of the system is reduced when an ideal measure-
ment is carried out. While the Schrdinger equation is time reversible, 
measurement operates only forward in time, and this may be thought of as 
32.See e.g. Oriti, Daniele 2009, Approaches to Quantum Gravity, Toward a New Understand-
ing of Space, Time and Matter, p. xvi: “I think it is fair to say that we are still far from 
having constructed a satisfactory theory of quantum gravity, and that any single approach 
currently being considered is too incomplete or poorly understood, whatever its strength and 
successes may be, to claim to have achieved its goal, or to have proven to be the only 
reasonable way to proceed.”
33.Cf. the discussion in Majid, Shahn 2008, “Quantum Spacetime and Physical Reality,” pp. 
67-69. 
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defining the quantum mechanical arrow of time. But since the Schrdinger 
equation already determines the probabilities of measured outcomes, via the 
Born rule, and nothing tells us which outcome will actually be measured on a 
particular trial, this emphasizes the normal quantum mechanics of the Born 
rule. To find the probability that the wave function will collapse to a specific 
state, you take the square of the coefficient of that possible outcome in the 
Schrdinger equation. The use of the Born rule is empirically adequate, and it 
does not follow from the Schrdinger equation. In view of these two elements is 
quantum theory deterministic and temporally symmetric or not?
Amongst the mathematical complexities of the physicists efforts to explain 
exactly how and why all physical laws are “time-reversal invariant,” it seems 
sometimes to be forgotten that there is a genuine paradox arising from this 
recurrent motif of fundamental physics. Temporal invariance implies that it is 
possible, for example, for a tree to shrink down to a shoot and return to the state 
of a seed, that the old might evolve into younger people and eventually disap-
pear by becoming unborn, or that a dispersion of light could concentrate itself 
into a narrow beam and return to a flashlight or laser, say. Reverse processes 
are not frequently observed in nature, though the fundamental laws don’t dictate 
this result. The examples can be multiplied at will, and they represent the 
physical reality of varieties of unidirectional processes, consistent with our 
ordinary conception of time pointing from past toward the future. Supposing 
they are extremely unlikely and not simply impossible, the question persists of 
why they are extremely unlikely. Why does nature favor processes which 
increase entropy?  
It is held by physicist Lorenzo Maccone, in a fascinating short paper, that
In fact, the laws of physics are time-reversal invariant. Hence there is no 
preferred direction of time according to which we may establish a substantial
difference between the two temporal directions past-to-future and future-to-
past.34
Maccone’s intriguing proposal is that though macroscopic reversals of entropy 
in isolated systems are statistically and therefore physically possible,35 they 
leave no evidence—where, as expected, “thermodynamic entropy is a quantity 
that measures how the usable energy in a physical process is degraded into 
heat.”36 Avoiding any “substantial” (or fundamental) conception of temporal 
asymmetry, Maccone also takes the surprising view that “thermodynamic 
entropy is a subjective quantity,” though “for all practical situations this is 
completely irrelevant.”37
His argument is that there is a hidden assumption build into the various state-
ments of the second law of thermodynamics, to the effect that whenever an 
isolated system is obtained by combing two theretofore distinguished systems, 
34.Maccone, Lorenzo 2009, “A Quantum Solution to the Arrow of Time Dilemma,” arXiv: 
0802.0438v3. p. 5; published in Physical. Review. Letters. 103. 
35.Cf. the discussion in Greene 2004, The Fabric of the Cosmos, pp. 159-163. Greene’s point is 
that the purely statistical reasoning of the second law equally suggests that entropy will be 
found to increase in the past of any system considered, since states of higher entropy are 
generally more probable. 
36.Maccone 2009, p. 1. 
37. Ibid.
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“the second law is valid only if the two systems were initially uncorrelated, i.e., 
if their initial joint entropy is the sum of their individual entropies.”38 But, he 
holds, it is impossible to know whether a given system is in fact correlated with 
another in some unknown way, and in consequence, as a practical matter all 
systems are considered uncorrelated without clear evidence to the contrary. 
Without this assumption, he argues, “it would be impossible to assign an 
entropy to a system unless the state of the whole universe is known.”39 In spite 
of the practicality of the second law, then, Maccone’s proposals involve a more 
emphatic version of the distinction between fundamental physics and secondary 
or derivative law. 
The more emphatic character stands out in the general thesis of the article, 
which states that though “the laws of physics are invariant for time inversion,” 
and “the familiar phenomena of everyday are not,” the paradox is solved, 
according to the argument of the paper, since it argues that “phenomenon where 
entropy decreases” will fail to “leave any information of their having 
happened,” and this situation “is completely indistinguishable from their not 
having happened at all.”40
The position is remarkable, since it preserves temporal invariance by placing 
any evidence of processes of decreasing entropy beyond possible observation, 
and in consequence, the second law of thermodynamics, according to Maccone, 
is reduced to a “tautology.” This is a strong claim, and one may easily suppose 
to the contrary that reverse processes may be observed—at least under simpli-
fied experimental conditions. 
Without considering Maccone’s central argument, which is based on the 
physical possibility of reverse processes resulting in decreasing entropy (greater 
free energy), his position illustrates just how far physicists are willing to go to 
preserve the claimed symmetry or temporal invariance of fundamental physics. 
It is a concise and fascinating little paper, and I only aim to suggest doubts 
about its conclusion. That we do not (or do not frequently) observe macroscopic 
temporal reversals of physical processes (in closed systems) seems a point too 
physically significant to want to explain away. The specifics of Maccone’s 
thought experiment are impossible in practice, since it involves control at the 
quantum level of the results of the forward process, and subsequent erasure of 
all evidence of it. Part of the interest of the paper is that it rests on an equiva-
lence of quantum processes with information.    
Turning to a more prominent view of the relationship between fundamental 
physics and quantum indeterminacy, I want to briefly consider Brian Greene’s 
discussions of the arrow of time, and in particular, “Time and the Quantum,” 
Chapter 7, of his 2004 book. This is a fine exposition of the related questions, 
posed in terms open to the broad, educated public. Greene defends the determi-
nistic, temporal-symmetry orthodoxy. His question in the chapter is “whether 
there is a temporal arrow in the quantum mechanical description of nature.”41
His conclusion reaffirms temporal invariance of fundamental law, including 
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41.Greene 2004, p. 177. 
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quantum mechanics, and links the arrow of time to the surprisingly low entropy 
of the initial condition of the universe, subsequent to the big bang—invoking a 
cosmological arrow of time. However, while the cosmological arrow of time is 
widely accepted, it too seems to require explanation. 
Greene’s provides a concise overview of the theme of quantum decoherence, 
together with an equally concise overview of the “quantum measurement 
problem,” and his question is posed within this rich theoretical context. In 
general terms, approaches to the interpretation of quantum mechanics via 
quantum decoherence can be viewed as a contemporary up-date and revision of 
a controversial element of the “Copenhagen interpretation” developed, early on 
by Niels Bohr, Heisenberg, Max Born and associates. The decoherence 
approach removes the stress placed on “observation” in earlier accounts of 
quantum-mechanical phenomena. 
The “quantum measurement problem” is something of a mare’s nest, a 
formidable complex of old and new arguments and doubts, including on occa-
sion, a continuing, popular fascination with the idea of a special role of observ-
ers in quantum mechanics, Einstein’s and Schrdinger’s early doubts about the 
Heisenberg uncertainty principle and the Bohr-Einstein debate,42 Bohm’s
hidden variable theory, including, again, doubts on the absence of classical 
determinism in quantum mechanics, discussions of the Bell inequalities, doubts 
about Alain Aspect’s famous experimental results supporting Bell,43 the 
contemporary proposals for “spontaneous collapse,”44 “multiple worlds” 
theories in which there is no collapse, and every possible mixture of these 
issues and themes. 
Greene acknowledge the appeal of the decoherence approach in obviating 
aspects of the quantum measurement problem. The idea is that there is nothing 
special about observation or measurement. “Human consciousness, human 
experimenters, and human observations would no longer play a special role 
since they (we!) would simply be elements of the environment, like air 
molecules and photons, which can interact with a given physical system.”45
Measurement is, according to the decoherence approach, simply one more inter-
action of a quantum system with its environment, in which the wavefunction of 
the system, and the possibility of interference-effects are reduced or modified. 
Again, “there would no longer be a stage one—stage two split between the 
42.See, e.g., Born, Max 1954, the Nobel Lecture, “The Statistical Interpretation of Quantum 
Mechanics,” p. 256. 
43.See e.g., the Journal of Cosmology, Vols. 3 and 14 on consciousness and the quantum; 
Bohm, David 1952, “A suggested Interpretation of Quantum Theory in terms of ‘Hidden’ 
Variables,” I and II. Physical Review, 85, pp. 166-193; Bub, Jeffery 2010, “Von Neumann’s 
‘no Hidden Variable’ Proof: A Re-Appraisal,” Foundations of Physics 4, pp. 1333-1340; 
arXiv:1006.0499v1; Bell, John 1993, Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics; 
Aspect, Alain, P. Grangier and Gerard Roger 1982, “Experimental Realization of the 
Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm Gedankenexperiment: A New Violation of Bell’s Inequali-
ties.”  
44.Regarding the “spontaneous collapse” proposal of Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber, Brian 
Greene remarks that “they introduce a collapse mechanism which does have a temporal 
arrow—an “uncollapsing” wavefunction, one that goes from a spiked to a spread out shape, 
would not conform to the modified equations.”  See Greene 2004, p. 214.  
45.Greene 2004, p. 212. 
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evolution of the object and the experimenter who measures them. Everything—
observed and observer—would be on an equal footing.”46 There is no need of 
an ad hoc, or physically unmotivated distinction between the quantum world 
and macroscopic objects or measuring instruments; and the lack of quantum 
weirdness in the macroscopic world falls out as an effect of environmental 
decoherence. Experimental detection of interference effects of quantum 
mechanical systems depends on isolating them and considering very small 
objects such as photons and electrons, as in the classical double-slit experi-
ments, but these idealized and isolated system are not typical of the complex 
interactions of real-world happenings: “much as adding tagging devices to the 
double-slit experiment blurs the resulting wavefunction and thereby washes out 
interference effects, the constant bombardment of objects by constituents of 
their environment also washes out the possibility of interference phenomena.”47
On the decoherence approach, there is an answer to the puzzle posed by the 
thought experiment of Schrdinger’s cat, since environmental decoherence 
would have plausibly taken effect long before any observer looks in on the 
situation.
I have little doubt that discussions of quantum measurement will continue 
among the physicists for many years to come, simply in virtue of the complexi-
ties involved. So long as the notion lingers that the measurement problem is a 
matter of getting exact predictions on particular experimental runs, however, 
and the question takes the form, e.g., “Why doesn’t the measurement of a parti-
cle in superposition result in a superposition of measurements?”—or, “why 
does something happen in measurement, not precisely predicted by the 
Schrdinger equation?”—then I suspect that the physicists will be barking up 
the wrong tree—where they implicitly put the uncertainty principle in question. 
As Greene puts the point, “Much in the spirit of Bohr, some physicists believe 
that searching for such an explanation of how a single, definite outcome arises 
is misguided.” Weinberg’s recent proposal is of this general character.48
“During measurement, “ Weinberg says, “the state vector of the microscopic 
system collapses in a probabilistic way to one of a number of classical states, in 
a way that is unexplained, and cannot be described by the time-dependent 
Schrdinger equation.” Weinberg’s approach avoids the “many worlds” and 
“hidden variables” views, and, borrowing from decoherence, avoids the classi-
cal “Copenhagen” approach as well.
46. Ibid. 
47.Greene 2004, p. 210. Cf. Carroll 2010, From Eternity to Here, p. 253-254: “In the many-
worlds interpretation, decoherence plays a crucial role in the apparent process of wavefunc-
tion collapse. The point is not that there is something special or unique about ‘conscious-
ness’ or ‘observers’ other than the fact that they are complicated macroscopic objects. The 
point is that any complicated macroscopic object is inevitably going to be interacting (and 
therefore entangled) with the outside world, and its hopeless to imagine keeping track of the 
precise form of the entanglement. For a tiny microscopic system such as an individual 
electron, we can isolate it and put it into a true quantum superposition, but for a messy 
system such as a human being … that’s just not possible.”
48.Greene 2004, p. 213. Cf. Weinberg, Steven 2012, “The Collapse of the State Vector,” 
arXiv:1109.6462v4, p.2: Weinberg proposes a “correction” to quantum mechanics which 
nonetheless eventuates in “inherently probabilistic collapse” of the state vector, with 
probabilities given by “the Born rule of ordinary quantum mechanics.” 
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V. Conclusion: Causality and indeterminacy
Causality and indeterminacy are fascinating and widely discussed philosophical 
topics, and they come together in considering the relationships of quantum 
indeterminacy and fundamental physics to the arrow of time. Since the arrow 
appears crucial in ordinary and scientific conceptions of causality, where an 
effect cannot proceed its cause,49 it would certainly be of interest to the topic of 
causality and related debates to find  a quantum mechanical arrow in support of 
a thermodynamic arrow. The most promising candidate for a quantum 
mechanical arrow of time is to locate it in the inherently probabilistic collapse 
of the wavefunction. Greene puts the point as follows: “if the resolution of the 
measurement problem that is one day accepted reveals a fundamental asymmet-
ric treatment of the future versus the past within quantum mechanics,” then “it 
could very well provide the most straightforward explanation of time’s 
arrow.”50 This is not the approach Green most favors, however. 
The point shows in Greene’s expressed doubts about decoherence. “Even 
though decoherence suppresses quantum interference and thereby coaxes weird 
quantum probabilities to be like their familiar classical counterparts,” he writes, 
“each of the potential outcomes embodied in a wavefunction still vies for reali-
zation. And so we are left wondering how one outcome ‘wins’ and where the 
many other possibilities ‘go’ when that actually happens.”51
But, I submit that Greene’s first conjunct here is just what we cannot require 
of an explanation, if the uncertainty principle is true and quantum chance is 
fundamental. Regarding the Bohm approach, since, according to Greene, 
equations are needed that show “how a wavefunction pushes a particle 
around,”52 and this would apparently require action superseding the speed of 
light in case of entanglement at astronomical distances, there is significant 
physical justification for taking quantum indeterminacy flatfootedly. 
Will accepting unidirectional state reduction, quantum indeterminacy and a 
quantum mechanical arrow help in understanding the observed unidirectional 
increase in entropy in physical processes, and, on that basis, a thermodynamic 
arrow of time? One idea is that nature favors state reduction toward conditions 
of increased entropy and that increases of quantum entanglement, due to diverse 
interaction increase entropy.53 But Greene is more intent on the cosmological 
arrow, based on the initial condition of low gravitational entropy in the theory 
of inflationary expansion. In spite of that, time symmetric laws cannot explain 
why the observed world has a comparatively low entropy (contrasting the 
projected heat-death of the universe) or why it had even lower entropy in the 
past. Moreover, in related approaches, inflationary expansion evokes the 
49.The supposition is that this is true, even if, as sometimes argued, causality is an “emergent” 
phenomenon. See for instance Norton, John D. 2003, “Causation as Folk Science,” p. 1, 
where the thesis is that though causation is not fundamental, it “remains a most helpful way 
of conceiving the world.” 
50.Greene 2004, p. 215.  
51. Ibid., p. 212. 
52. Ibid., p. 214. 
53.See Lloyd 2006, chapters 4 and 5 on thermodynamics, information and quantum mechanics. 
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multiverse and emphasis on the “anthropic principle.”54 These are develop-
ments which many would like to avoid. 
The prospect of finding an explanation of time’s arrow within quantum 
mechanics proper, continues to rest with the Born rule and the idea that in 
quantum mechanics chance is fundamental. Repeating the same experiment (i.e. 
the same cause), we get different measurements on different trials. Though 
resistance to quantum mechanical indeterminacy has sometimes rested on 
holding onto traditional conceptions of universal causality, fundamental 
physical support for causality’s arrow of time, may ultimately rest on quantum 
indeterminacy. 
The point is somewhat obscured at present, and the obscurity is not unrelated 
to the role of traditional conceptions of “fundamental physics” in the specula-
tive boom in contemporary physics. This has been stimulated by a number of 
factors, including the end of the Cold War, the availability of the Large Hadron 
Collider at CERN, the recent progress of the Standard model, and more basi-
cally, the conceptual conflicts between general relativity and quantum mechan-
ics. While there is no contrary evidence to these great twentieth-century 
paradigms of physics, there has been much theoretical work, of a more specula-
tive character, which aims at models of unification. The possible approaches go 
off in many diverse directions, though temporal symmetry in fundamental 
physics is the usual orthodoxy. 
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